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This box describes the key features of the most recent update of the 
Banco de España’s economic projections for the Spanish economy. 
In comparison with the previous projections, published on 14 December 
2018,1 the current projections incorporate the preliminary results of 
the quarterly national accounts for the fourth quarter of 2018 and the 
changes in the technical assumptions derived from the information 
collected since the last exercise (see Table 1).2 
The projections anticipate the prolongation of the upturn in the 
Spanish economy over the three-year period 2019-2021 (see 
Table 2). These expectations are based on the continued existence 
of the factors that have been underpinning growth since the start 
of the recovery including, in particular, the competitiveness 
improvements achieved since the start of the crisis, the 
strengthening of the financial situation of businesses, households 
and financial institutions and the accommodative stance of 
monetary policy. In addition, the prolongation, in the short run, of 
the expansionary budgetary policy stance should be mentioned. 
This combination of factors would allow the economy to continue 
to grow at significantly above its potential rate, which would 
facilitate further absorption of the high unemployment generated 
by the crisis.
That said, the buoyancy of activity will tend to moderate over the 
projection horizon. In terms of annual average rates, after growing 
by 2.5% in 2018, growth is projected to be 2.2% in 2019, 1.9% in 
2020 and 1.7% in 2021. As regards 2019, the slowdown basically 
reflects a deterioration in the external environment, which has 
been having a negative effect on exports since 2018 and which in 
the short run will contribute, through the impact on uncertainty, to 
a weakening in private demand (in particular, business investment). 
In the medium and long run, various factors explain the projected 
moderation in the rate of growth. First, although monetary policy 
will continue to be expansionary, the effects on GDP growth of the 
measures implemented in this area in recent years will gradually 
decline. The convergence towards a more neutral monetary policy 
stance is now expected to be notably more gradual than was 
anticipated three months ago, as a result of the downward shift in 
the path of short-term interest rates expected by the markets. This 
is partly a consequence of the action taken by the ECB to guide 
agents’ expectations and, in particular, of the decisions adopted 
by the Governing Council on 7 March.3
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1  Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2021): the 
Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s December 2018 
joint forecasting exercise.
2  The cut-off date for the December 2018 projections was 21 November 
2018. The cut-off date for the present exercise is 7 March 2018, except 
for the data on export markets and the prices of competitors in their 
national currency, which were taken from the ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections for the euro area, March 2019, which had a cut-off date of 12 
February 2019. 
3  See Box 4 (“Market expectations about the euro area benchmark interest 
rate”) and Section 3.2 of this Quarterly Report.
2018 2019 2020 2021 2019 2020 2021
International environment
0.00.01.0-3.34.33.35.3tuptuo dlroW    
1.0-2.0-6.0-3.36.37.21.3stekram tropxe s'niapS    
1.3-4.2-7.2-8.264.469.461.17)level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO    
Monetary and financial conditions
00.000.000.041.141.141.181.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
    Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the non-euro area (c)
    (2000 = 100 and percentage differences)
121.5 117.7 117.6 117.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
3.0-2.0-0.00.02.0-3.0-3.0-)d( )ROBIRUE htnom-3( etar tseretni mret-trohS    
6.0-6.0-6.0-8.15.13.14.1)d( )dleiy dnob raey-01( etar tseretni mret-gnoL    
Difference between current
projections and December
2018 projections (b)
March 2019 projections
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Assumptions cut-off date: 7 March 2019. The figures expressed as levels are annual averages; the figures expressed as rates are calculated based on the relevant 
annual averages. 
b Differences are between rates in the case of world output and export markets, between levels in the case of oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, percen-
tages for the effective nominal exchange rate and in percentage points in the case of interest rates.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
d For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared using the Eurosystem's methodology. These assumptions are based on 
futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these variables.
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Also, although the expansionary fiscal measures approved since 
mid-2018 will support growth in the short run, in the absence of 
budget plans a neutral fiscal stance has been assumed for longer 
horizons. Finally, the projections incorporate the assumption that, 
given the current setting of continued relatively high levels of 
uncertainty and, above all, the historically low level of the savings 
ratio, households will be somewhat more cautious in their spending 
decisions. As a result, consumption dynamism is expected to 
moderate somewhat.
As for inflation, the extension of the upturn, with GDP growth rates 
above potential, is expected to lead to a gradual widening of the 
positive output gap and, therefore, to a rise in core inflation, as 
measured by the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP), 
excluding food and energy. Specifically, the annual average rate of 
change of this indicator is projected to be 1.1% in 2019, 1.6% in 
2020 and 1.8% in 2021. The path of the overall HICP is not very 
different, given the expected behaviour of the energy component.
In comparison with the preceding projections, the most important 
change in the assumptions on which the forecasts are based, in 
terms of the impact on the final variables, is some deterioration in the 
outlook for Spain’s export markets. This is reflected in a downward 
revision of 0.9 percentage points (pp), in cumulative terms, in the 
growth of these markets over the time horizon considered (see 
Table  1). Other changes, in the opposite direction, counteract the 
negative impact on activity arising from this revision. There has been 
a downward shift in the expected path of oil prices (measured in US 
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Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACRO MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA data: 2018 Q4
a Projections cut-off date: 13 March 2019.
b Includes machinery, capital goods, weapons systems, cultivated biological resources and intellectual property products.
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dollars), which is beneficial to growth in the real incomes of private 
agents. At the same time, the expected paths of interbank market 
interest rates and public debt yields have moved downwards since 
the cut-off date for the assumptions of the preceding projections. 
Thus, although the cost of financing is expected to rise somewhat 
over the projection horizon, it is now not expected to rise by as much 
as three months ago.
Turning to budgetary policy, the changes in the assumptions are 
small. On 1 January 2019, the 2018 State budget was extended 
into 2019. This extension was accompanied by various royal 
decrees and remains in force following the rejection by Parliament 
on 13 February of the draft State budget for 2019 presented in 
January. These decrees included measures relating, in particular, 
to the updating of pensions, an increase in public sector wages, a 
rise in contribution bases (7%, in the case of the maximum base 
and in line with the increase in the national minimum wage, in the 
case of the minimum base) and changes in the arrangements for 
self-employed workers.4 However, only the latter two measures 
amount to changes with respect to the previous projections 
exercise, since the others had already been announced before the 
cut-off date for such projections and were incorporated in them. 
Also, more recently, the Government has approved further 
expansionary measures, including notably the extension of 
benefits to unemployed persons over the age of 52 and the 
extension of paternity leave to eight weeks.
Apart from the measures already adopted, it was decided, as in 
other recent projection exercises, to use technical assumptions to 
obtain the expected path of fiscal variables. The items of the 
general government accounts subject to most discretionality 
(including notably, due to their size, government consumption and 
public investment) are assumed to change in line with the nominal 
potential growth of the economy, while the path of other items is 
linked to the behaviour of their usual determinants. In particular, it 
is assumed that public revenues will grow in line with tax bases, 
which mainly depend on the macroeconomic environment. For 
less discretionary items of spending, including the measures 
recently approved by royal decree law, similar assumptions are 
proposed. As a result, it is assumed that pension spending 
changes in line with the increases approved for 2019 and, 
subsequently, will be determined by the legally established formula 
for increases and by population ageing. At the same time, 
unemployment benefit is linked to the behaviour of unemployment, 
and debt interest payments to the behaviour of public debt and 
the cost of borrowing.5 In accordance with all these assumptions 
for the behaviour of budgetary variables and with the output gap 
estimated consistently with the other macroeconomic projections, 
fiscal policy will be expansionary in 2019. The budget deficit is 
projected to fall slightly in 2019, to 2.5% (0.2 pp less than in 2018), 
this being a slight upward revision (of 0.1 pp) with respect to the 
previous forecast, and subsequently somewhat more sharply, to 
reach 1.8% by the end of the forecast horizon.
The projected average annual GDP growth rates are unchanged 
from December. The main reason for this stability is that the overall 
impact on activity of the changes described in the assumptions 
that form the basis for the projections is more or less neutral. 
Moreover, as regards 2019, there are factors with the opposite 
sign that offset each other, so that the GDP growth projection 
remains at 2.2%. On the one hand, at the end of 2018 growth was 
somewhat more favourable than anticipated in previous 
projections. Also, the short-term information indicates that the 
economy remained buoyant in 2019 Q1, when GDP growth is 
estimated to have been 0.6%. On the other hand, activity is 
expected to be less buoyant in Q2 and Q3, in comparison with the 
December projections, as a consequence of the continued 
weakness of the euro area economy at the beginning of the year, 
as reflected in the recent ECB staff projections.6 
For the two-year period 2020-2021, the lack of revisions to GDP 
growth is explained by the fact that, in line with these projections 
for the euro area, it is assumed that the factors that have caused 
euro area activity to weaken are predominantly temporary, and will 
therefore cease to operate from the end of this year, assuming that 
the main areas of risk arising from the global environment will not 
fully materialise. 
As for inflation, the net effect of the new assumptions is, as in the 
case of activity, approximately neutral. However, the recent 
surprising behaviour of the core component, which suggests that 
the degree of pass-through to prices of the observed rise in the 
growth rate of unit labour costs has been lower than was expected 
in the December projections, justifies a downward revision to the 
path of core inflation. This revision should be more pronounced at 
the beginning than at the end of the projection period, as the 
ongoing decline in the degree of slack in the economy will cause 
inflationary pressures to rise.
Growth in activity will continue to be driven by national demand, 
although the latter’s positive contribution to GDP growth will tend to 
moderate gradually over the forecast horizon. By contrast, the 
negative contribution of external demand to GDP growth, which was 
relatively large in 2018, will gradually decline, to reach zero in 2021. 
Within national demand, the buoyancy of private consumption will 
continue to be supported by strong job creation. Also, the growth 
rate of household income will be driven by the projected rise in real 
wages and, in the short term, by the stimulus from the budgetary 
4  Also incorporated in the projections for 2019 is the fact that a significant 
part of the impact of the changes in personal income tax approved in the 
budget for 2018 has, contrary to what was expected, still not been 
observed in the budget outturn data and has therefore been shifted to 
the current year.
5  An increase in public spending in 2018 was included in the December 
projections as a result of a Supreme Court judgment annulling the 
privatisation of Aigües del Ter i Llobregat, which took place in 2012. In 
practice, the increase in spending has been recorded in 2012, which 
resulted in a reduction in spending last year. Also, the income from the 
re-tendering of the insolvent toll motorways, which was previously 
expected in 2019 but is now expected later, has been excluded. 6  ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, March 2019.
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measures approved in 2018 and early 2019. In comparison with 
the December projections, the slight upward revision to the growth 
rate of private consumption reflects the increase in the purchasing 
power of nominal household income against a background in 
which, as mentioned above, price increases are more contained 
than they were forecast to be three months ago. In any case, 
private consumption is expected to slow gradually, due to a 
number of different factors. First, as already indicated, the current 
projections incorporate the assumption that, in an environment of 
greater global uncertainty, households will tend to raise their 
savings ratio, which is currently close to its all-time low. Also, the 
propensity to consume increases in employment income will tend 
to be lower than in the recent past. This is because such increases 
derive to a greater extent from rises in real wages than from job 
creation and the propensity to consume is lower for the former 
than for the latter. The final factor underlying the projected 
slowdown in private consumption is the completion of the process 
of taking the decisions to acquire the durable and semi-durable 
goods whose acquisition had been postponed during the crisis.
Favourable funding conditions will continue to support the 
expansionary behaviour of the various components of investment. 
In particular, residential investment is expected to continue to 
grow at high rates, driven by buoyant household creation and 
vigorous job creation. That said, the momentum of this aggregate 
is expected to gradually decline over the projection horizon.
The growth of business investment will be based on the strength 
of final demand, the high capacity utilisation and the sustained 
balance sheet clean-up in the sector. However, this component is 
also expected to slow somewhat, in line with the reduced strength 
of final demand and the outlook of continuing moderate export 
growth, which will limit the investment spending of firms with a 
high proportion of foreign sales. In comparison with the December 
projections, the downward revision to this component is more 
pronounced than for the other components of private demand, 
since it is affected more directly by the increase in uncertainty in 
the rest of the world.
The projected improvement in the contribution of the external 
sector to GDP growth is based on the expected increase in export 
dynamism. Exports weakened very significantly in 2018, by more 
than their markets, due to predominantly temporary factors. These 
include the delayed impact on sales outside the euro area of the 
euro depreciation in 2017 and the recovery in tourist flows to 
certain competitor countries in the Mediterranean basin. The 
disappearance of these effects should allow the market share 
gains that have been recorded for most of the recovery, as a 
consequence of the competitiveness gains accumulated since the 
start of the crisis and the increase in regular exporters, to resume. 
However, as mentioned when describing the changes to the 
assumptions, the deterioration in the external environment has led 
to a downward revision to expected growth in external markets. 
This is reflected in lower expected export growth than in the 
December projections. As in December, the import projections 
incorporate the assumption that the elasticity of this final demand 
component will be somewhat higher than during the initial years of 
the recovery (although lower than in the last two years). 
The weakening of GDP growth rates over the projection horizon 
will be accompanied by a loss of momentum in employment of 
similar magnitude, except in the short term, when the slowdown in 
employment will tend to be intensified by the impact of the 
increase in the national minimum wage at the beginning of 2019. 
Continued job creation will allow further reductions in the 
unemployment rate, although their magnitude will be reduced by 
the rise in the labour force. Current projections envisage a fall in 
the unemployment rate to 12% by the end of the projection 
horizon, similar to the level expected three months ago.
On currently available information, the Spanish economy’s net 
lending is expected to fall in 2018 by approximately 1 pp to around 
1.2% of GDP, as a result of the decline in real flows of goods and 
services and the deterioration in the real terms of trade, basically 
due to the rise in oil prices. During the projection period a further 
modest decline is expected in the nation’s net lending, of 0.5 pp of 
GDP to 2021, similar to the reduction expected three months ago. 
The growth of compensation per employee is expected to be 
significantly higher during the projection period than in recent 
years. This reflects the gradual reduction in labour market slack, 
wage settlements, as at mid-2018, under the collective bargaining 
agreement for the period 2018-2020 (which recommends annual 
rises of 2% plus a variable component) and, in 2019, the increase 
in the national minimum wage. The pick-up in compensation per 
employee, against a background of continuing low productivity 
growth, will lead to higher unit labour cost growth rates. Despite 
the projected containment of profit margins, this will increase 
domestic inflationary pressures. By contrast, those of external 
origin, as measured by the import deflator, are expected to weaken 
in the short run. 
Specifically, in terms of consumer prices, the energy component has 
slowed significantly since the end of last year, due to the fall in oil 
prices in the latter part of 2018 and the base effects deriving from 
their previous rise. This trend is projected to intensify during 2019. 
For the rest of the projection horizon, according to futures prices, the 
expected path of oil prices has a mildly negative profile. This, 
combined with the assumptions for electricity prices, is expected to 
produce rates of change in the energy component of close to zero. 
Given these developments, the rate of change of the HICP will fall 
slightly in the short run, increasing gradually thereafter in line with 
core inflation. Thus, the average annual rate of change of the HICP is 
expected to be 1.2% in 2019, 1.6% in 2020 and 1.7% in 2021.
The risks to the central growth scenario are on the downside, 
mainly as a result of external uncertainties. In particular, as already 
mentioned, the prospects for short-term growth in Spanish export 
markets have been revised downwards, in line with recent activity 
data for the world (and, in particular, for the euro area, Spain’s 
main trading partner), and are now less favourable than they were 
assumed to be three months ago. At the same time, the hypotheses 
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regarding the future behaviour of Spanish export markets (deriving 
from the latest ECB staff forecasting exercise) consider that the 
recent slowdown is temporary and will be reversed in the second 
half of the year. However, the recent activity weakness, especially 
in the euro area, could be more persistent, leading to a less 
favourable performance by the Spanish economy than envisaged 
in the central scenario. 
In addition, a number of risk factors persist that would lead to less 
favourable developments were they to materialise. Specifically, 
the lack of clarity regarding the terms of the United Kingdom’s 
departure from the European Union means that certain scenarios 
that could have very severe consequences for both areas cannot 
be completely ruled out. Also, uncertainty persists regarding the 
possible adoption of new protectionist measures at global level 
that would distort world production and result in the revision of 
business investment plans. Finally, the Chinese authorities are 
facing the difficulty of balancing fiscal and monetary stimulus for 
the economy, to alleviate the current slowdown, with attempting to 
halt the rise in the indebtedness of private and public agents.
Domestically, a high degree of uncertainty persists regarding the 
future economic policy stance and, in particular, fiscal adjustment 
(which is needed to reduce the high level of public debt that is still 
one of the main sources of vulnerability for the Spanish economy) 
and the adoption of measures to raise the long-run potential 
growth rate. Also, continuation of the current upturn requires that 
the competitiveness gains relative to the rest of the world achieved 
in recent years be maintained. It would therefore be desirable for 
wage rises to reflect the specific circumstances of each firm or 
sector and, in particular, productivity growth, avoiding general 
economy-wide increases that bear no relation to such specific 
conditions. In addition, price and wage setting mechanisms 
should be sufficiently flexible to allow adaptation, where necessary, 
to a more pronounced slowdown in activity, so as to limit possible 
activity and employment losses.
